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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Andrew P. Sherrod *
Jaime B. Wisegarver **
INTRODUCTION
This article surveys recent significant developments in Virginia
civil practice and procedure. Part I of this article discusses opin-
ions of the Supreme Court of Virginia from June 2013 through
June 2014 addressing noteworthy civil procedure topics. Part II
addresses amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia concerning procedural issues during the same period. Part
III discusses legislation enacted by the Virginia General Assem-
bly during its 2014 session that relates to civil practice.
I. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Contemporaneous Objection Rule
In three different opinions handed down in February 2014, the
Supreme Court of Virginia analyzed the contemporaneous objec-
tion exception set forth in Virginia Code section 8.01-384(A).'
While decided in the criminal context, these cases provide im-
portant lessons for civil trial lawyers as well. Two of the appeals,
Maxwell v. Commonwealth and Rowe v. Commonwealth, were
considered together, as they presented two different applications
of Virginia Code section 8.01-384(A).2
* Principal, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2000, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law; B.A., 1996, Hampden-Sydney College.
** Associate, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2010, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2005, University of Virginia.
1. Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 258, 261, 754 S.E.2d 516, 517 (2014) (decided
with companion case Rowe v. Commonwealth 287 Va. 258, 261, 754 S.E.2d 516, 517
(2014)); Commonwealth v. Amos, 287 Va. 301, 305, 754 S.E.2d 304, 305 (2014).
2. Maxwell, 287 Va. at 261, 754 S.E.2d at 517.
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In Maxwell, Derick Ganson Maxwell was indicted for unlawful
wounding and tried before a jury for the offense in the Frederick
County Circuit Court.' Immediately after the jury left the court-
room to begin deliberations, Maxwell's counsel requested that she
be allowed to return to her office. The Assistant Commonwealth's
Attorney also left the courtroom to await the verdict.' Upon its re-
turn, the jury found Maxwell guilty.'
After the circuit court dismissed the jury, Maxwell's counsel
was alerted to the fact that there had been a jury question.! The
circuit court confirmed that a jury question arose but that there
had been no reason for Maxwell or his counsel to be present.!
Subsequently, Maxwell filed a motion to set aside his conviction
on the basis that the court's ex parte communications with the ju-
ry violated his Sixth Amendment rights and his right to be pre-
sent during trial.' When the circuit court denied the motion,
Maxwell appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia and as-
signed error to the circuit court's ex parte communication with
the jury." The court of appeals held that "Rule 5A:18 prohibited
consideration of the merits of Maxwell's assignment of error be-
cause Maxwell did not make a contemporaneous objection to the
circuit court's allegedly improper communications with the ju-
,,11
ry.
In Rowe, Vincent A. Rowe was tried by a jury and found guilty
of grand larceny." In its closing argument, the Commonwealth
stated that inferences could support a finding of guilt." At the
conclusion of the Commonwealth's closing argument, Rowe's at-
torney requested to make a motion outside the presence of the ju-
ry, and the Portsmouth City Circuit Court responded that it
3. Id. at 262, 754, S.E.2d at 517.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 263, 754 S.E.2d at 518; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-259, 263.1 (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2014) (addressing a defendant's presence in proceedings and prohibit-
ing any contact between the judge and a juror outside the presence of the parties or coun-
sel).
10. Maxwell, 287 Va. at 263, 754 S.E.2d at 518.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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would address the motion when the jury went out to deliberate.14
After the jury left, the defense made a motion for a mistrial, argu-
ing that the Commonwealth's statements concerning the fact that
Rowe did not take the stand or present any evidence "were undu-
ly prejudicial and warranted a mistrial."" The circuit court de-
nied the motion for mistrial.16
On appeal to the court of appeals, Rowe alleged that the circuit
court erred by denying his motion because the Commonwealth's
comments during closing argument improperly shifted the burden
to the defense." The court of appeals refused to consider the mer-
its of the assignment of error, "holding that Rowe's objection to
the Commonwealth's closing statement was not timely made." 8
The Supreme Court of Virginia explained that the purpose of
the contemporaneous objection rule set forth in Rule 5A:18 "is to
avoid unnecessary appeals by affording the trial judge an oppor-
tunity to rule intelligently on objections."" To meet the require-
ments of Rule 5A:18, an objection must "be made ... at a point in
the proceeding when the [circuit] court is in a position, not only to
consider the asserted error, but also to rectify the effect of the as-
serted error."20 However, Virginia Code section 8.01-384(A) "re-
quires appellate courts to consider issues on appeal that do not
satisfy the contemporaneous objection requirement when the liti-
gant had no opportunity to make the requisite timely objection."2'
14. Id. at 264, 754 S.E.2d at 518.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 264-65, 754 S.E.2d at 519 (quoting State Highway Comm'r v. Easley, 215
Va. 197, 201, 207 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1974)).
20. Id. 287 Va. at 265, 754 S.E.2d at 519 (quoting Scialdone v. Commonwealth, 279
Va. 422, 437, 689 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2010)).
21. Id. at 265, 754 S.E.2d at 519.
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court shall be unnecessary; but
for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary, it shall
be sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made
or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to
take or his objections to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and,
if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is
made, the absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him on mo-
tion for a new trial or on appeal. No party, after having made an objection or
motion known to the court, shall be required to make such objection or mo-
tion again in order to preserve his right to appeal, challenge, or move for re-
consideration of, a ruling, order, or action of the court. No party shall be
2014] 29
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Maxwell and Rowe both argued that section 8.01-384(A) applied
to preserve their respective assignments of error.2
With respect to Maxwell, the supreme court found that section
8.01-384(A) required consideration of his argument on appeal.2 3
When the judge received and answered the questions raised by
the jury, neither Maxwell nor his attorney were present in the
courtroom.2 4 Though through no fault of their own, because they
were absent, "Maxwell and his counsel did not have the oppor-
tunity to be present and challenge the court's decision to address
questions from the jury in their absence."25 In Rowe, however, the
supreme court held that the defendant failed to alert the circuit
court to the nature of his objection before the jury retired and
consequently, Rule 5A:18 barred consideration of the objection on
appeal." Rowe did not raise a discernible objection at a time when
the court could appropriately act." Importantly, Rowe's motion
"failed to set forth for the court the details of his objection or the
time-sensitive nature of his motion."28 For these reasons, the su-
preme court concluded that the court of appeals did not err in re-
fusing to consider Rowe's challenge to the Commonwealth's alleg-
edly improper statements made during its closing argument."
deemed to have agreed to, or acquiesced in, any written order of a trial court
so as to forfeit his right to contest such order on appeal except by express
written agreement in his endorsement of the order. Arguments made at trial
via written pleading, memorandum, recital of objections in a final order, oral
argument reduced to transcript, or agreed written statements of facts shall,
unless expressly withdrawn or waived, be deemed preserved therein for as-
sertion on appeal.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-384(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2014).
22. Maxwell, 287 Va. at 265, 754 S.E.2d at 519.
23. Id. at 266, 754 S.E.2d at 520.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 266-67, S.E.2d at 520.
26. Id. at 267-68, 754 S.E.2d at 520-21.
27. Id. at 267, 754 S.E.2d at 520.
28. Id. at 268, 754 S.E.2d at 521.
29. Id. at 269, 754 S.E.2d at 521. Justice Lemons and Justice Mims dissented, stating
that in their judgment, Rowe's request was sufficient to preserve the matter for appellate
review since the basis for the request was readily apparent under the circumstances. Id. at
270-71, 754 S.E.2d at 521-22 (Lemons, J., dissenting). The dissent went on to state that
had Rowe's counsel argued with the judge immediately before the jury retired, he would
have risked prejudicing the jury against his client. Id. According to the dissent, "[c]ivility
and decorum on the part of defense counsel should not be equated to a waiver of the de-
fendant's fundamental right to appeal." Id.
[Vol. 49:2730
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The supreme court again discussed the contemporaneous objec-
tion exception in Commonwealth v. Amos. 30 Antonio Jose Amos
was convicted of assaulting his estranged wife, Felecia Amos."
Mr. Amos was ordered to have no contact with Ms. Amos during
his probation." Ms. Amos later wrote to the Office of the Com-
monwealth Attorney alleging that Mr. Amos harassed her." Upon
receiving this letter, the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney
sought and obtained a rule to show cause against Mr. Amos. 4 At
the hearing on the show cause order, Ms. Amos' testimony was
contradicted by that of Mr. Amos and another individual who was
present when the harassment allegedly took place.3 ' A tape re-
cording of the incident made by Mr. Amos further contradicted
Ms. Amos' account of the events.
The circuit court ruled that Mr. Amos did not violate the terms
and conditions of his probation.3 ' The court went on to hold Ms.
Amos in contempt of court for lying under oath." Ms. Amos was
sentenced to ten days in jail and was immediately taken to jail."
She did not make any statements to the circuit court judge at the
time of the contempt ruling.4 0
Ms. Amos later filed a pro se motion contesting her sentence
and the court's ruling, in which she argued, among other things,
that she testified truthfully at trial and the circuit court never
gave her an opportunity to object to the finding of contempt." Ms.
Amos also filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals of
Virginia.42 The court of appeals reversed Ms. Amos' summary con-
tempt conviction, concluding that the circuit court deprived her of
30. 287 Va. 301, 303, 754 S.E.2d 304, 305 (2014).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 304, 754 S.E.2d at 305.
34. Id.
35. Id., 754 S.E.2d at 306.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 304-05, 754 S.E.2d at 306.
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any opportunity to object at the time of the ruling.43 The Com-
monwealth appealed to the supreme court.
As the supreme court explained, Virginia Code section 8.01-
384(A) imposes no requirement that when the contemporaneous
objection exception applies, a party, if able, must file a post-
conviction objection or otherwise bring the objection to the court's
attention at a later point in the proceedings. Importantly, in this
case Ms. Amos was not a party-she was a witness who was not
represented by counsel. Following the judge's ruling, Ms. Amos
was immediately taken to jail, which prevented her from present-
ing a contemporaneous objection. Therefore, the contemporaneous
objection exception of section 8.01-384(A) applied and no further
steps were required to preserve the issues for appellate review.
B. Endorsement of Orders and Waiver
Before analyzing the substantive defamation issues in Cashion
v. Smith, the Supreme Court of Virginia first tackled the question
of whether an endorsement of an order withdrew or waived an is-
sue for appeal under Virginia Code section 8.01-384(A). 47 Follow-
ing a patient's death, the surgeon criticized the anesthesiologist
in front of other members of the operating team, accusing him of
purposefully failing to resuscitate the patient.4 ' The surgeon re-
peatedly stated that the anesthesiologist euthanized the patient.
The anesthesiologist sued for defamation and defamation per
se against the surgeon and his employer." The defendants "filed
demurrers and pleas in bar asserting . . . that [the surgeon's]
statements were non-actionable expressions of opinion or rhetori-
cal hyperbole."" After a hearing on the motions, the circuit court
entered an order "sustaining the demurrers and granting the
pleas in bar as to the non-euthanasia statements on the ground
43. Id. at 305, 754 S.E.2d at 306.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 286 Va. 327, 333, 749 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2013).
48. Id. at 332, 749 S.E.2d at 528-29.
49. Id., 749 S.E.2d at 529.
50. Id.
51. Id.
32 [Vol. 49:27
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that they were non-actionable expressions of opinion."52 As to the
euthanasia statements, the circuit court overruled the demurrers
and denied the pleas in bar." Counsel for the anesthesiologist
noted their objections on the circuit court's order and endorsed it
"WE ASK FOR THIS."54
On appeal, the anesthesiologist argued that the circuit court
erred by sustaining the demurrers and pleas in bar as to the non-
euthanasia statements." The defendants responded by arguing
that the anesthesiologist withdrew or waived that argument for
appeal under section 8.01-384(A) because he endorsed the order
"WE ASK FOR THIS."" The supreme court disagreed."
"[In] order for a waiver to occur within the meaning of Code §
8.01-384(A), the record must affirmatively show that the party
who has asserted an objection has abandoned the objection or has
demonstrated by his conduct the intent to abandon that objec-
tion."" After summarizing prior case law regarding the effect of
endorsements, the supreme court concluded that the "WE ASK
FOR THIS" endorsement reflected only the anesthesiologist's re-
quest that the court enter an order memorializing its ruling." The
endorsement did not constitute his agreement to the portion of
the order adverse to him and thus, was not an "express written
agreement" to waive the argument on appeal.o
C. Assignment of Error
In Ferguson v. Stokes, the Supreme Court of Virginia reiterated
the well-settled rule that in order for a party to challenge the rul-
ing of a lower court, he must, on appeal, assign error to each ar-
ticulated basis for that ruling." Ferguson was an ejectment action
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 333, 749 S,E,2d at 529.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 333-34, 749 S.E.2d at 529-30 (quoting Kellesman v. McDonough, 278 Va.
478, 491, 684 S.E.2d 786, 792 (2009)).
59. Id. at 336, 749 S.E.2d at 531.
60. Id.
61. 287 Va. 446, 452, 756 S.E.2d 455, 458 (2014) (citing Manchester Oaks Homeown-
ers Ass'n v. Batt. 284 Va. 409. 421. 732 S.E.2d 690, 698 (2012)).
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involving a man-made island in the Rappahannock River.12 At
trial, Ferguson, the owner of the island, argued that the eject-
ment action failed because, pursuant to Virginia Code section
28.2-1200.1(B)(2), he owned title to the bottomlands beneath the
island." The plaintiffs argued that Ferguson did not specifically
plead the statute as a defense to the ejectment action and there-
fore could not rely on section 28.2-1200.1(b)(2). 64 The circuit court
agreed and held that Ferguson could not rely on section 28.2-
1200.1(B)(2) because it had not been properly pled and because
Ferguson could not meet the statute's substantive requirements.
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the circuit court's rul-
ing.6 The supreme court first noted that Ferguson had only as-
signed error to two of the three bases for the circuit court's ruling
on his ability to assert the defense of section 28.2-1200.1(B)(2)."
The court explained that it cannot review the ruling of a lower
court for error when the appellant does not assign error to every
legal basis given for that ruling." Nevertheless, the court went on
to find that because the circuit court properly found section 28.2-
1200.1(B)(2) inapplicable, this provided a separate and independ-
ent basis for the supreme court to affirm the circuit court's rul-
*69ing.
62. Id. at 449, 756 S.E.2d at 456-57.
63. Id. at 450, 756 S.E.2d at 457.
Titles to lands that (i) were once or may have been state-owned bottomlands
covered by waters, (ii) were filled prior to July 1, 1960, and (iii) were acquired
by private persons in good faith for value after such lands were filled, are
hereby declared to be free and clear of any claimed ownership or interest by
the Commonwealth and are released to such private persons and their suc-
cessors and assigns by the Commonwealth to the extent that the areas of the-
se lands were not state-owned bottomlands covered by waters on July 1,
1960.
VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1200.1(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
64. Ferguson, 287 Va. at 450, 756 S.E.2d at 457.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 454, 756 S.E.2d at 459.
67. Id. at 452, 756 S.E.2d at 458.
68. Id. (citing Prince Seating Corp. v. Rabideau, 275 Va. 468, 470, 659 S.E.2d 305, 307
(2008)).
69. Id. at 453, 756 S.E.2d at 459.
34 [Vol. 49:27
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D. Sanctions
In Shebelskie v. Brown, attorneys Michael R. Shebelskie and
William H. Wright, Jr. appealed the circuit court's judgment
sanctioning them pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-271. 1.70
Shebelskie and Wright represented Betty G. Brown in a suit filed
by her ex-husband, Larry E. Brown, seeking partition and judicial
sale of certain real property. After extensive litigation, the cir-
cuit court confirmed the sale of the property.7 2 Subsequently, the
court entered an order directing Ms. Brown to close on the pur-
chase of the property no later than May 5, 2011.73 The order also
required that Ms. Brown pay all costs and attorneys' fees in-
curred by Mr. Brown.74
Following the entry of the order, Wright questioned Mr.
Brown's counsel regarding the amount of attorneys' fees and costs
incurred." After Ms. Brown closed on the real property in accord-
ance with the terms of the order, the parties continued to discuss
how Mr. Brown's attorneys' fees and costs would be paid.76 Mr.
Brown rejected Wright's suggestion that the attorneys' fees and
costs be offset from money owed by Mr. Brown to Ms. Brown in
connection with their divorce.7 Subsequently, having not received
payment from Ms. Brown, Mr. Brown filed a motion for the issu-
ance of a rule to show cause as to why Ms. Brown should not be
held in contempt for failure to pay the attorneys' fees and costs in
accordance with the court's order.78 The circuit court issued a rule
71to show cause.
In Ms. Brown's brief in response to the rule to show cause,
Wright argued that the order was not yet final and, therefore, Ms.
Brown had no current obligation to pay." Further, Wright assert-
70. 287 Va. 18, 24-25, 752 S.E.2d 877, 880-81 (2014).
71. Id. at 22, 752 S.E.2d at 879.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 22-23, 752 S.E.2d at 879-80.
79. Id. at 23, 752 S.E.2d at 880.
80. Id.
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ed that the order did not set a "deadline for payment and [said]
nothing ... about the manner in which the payment [was] to be
made."" Finally, Wright argued that the order neglected to specif-
ically state the total amount due."
At the hearing on the rule to show cause, Shebelskie reiterated
Wright's arguments made in the brief." Shebelskie claimed that
because the order lacked specificity with respect to the due date
and the amount owed, it was an interlocutory order for which
there was no current obligation to pay." Importantly, Shebelskie
informed the court that Ms. Brown was not ignoring the court's
order-she had, in fact, discussed the amount and method of
payment with Mr. Brown." The court took the matter under ad-
visement to consider the possible section 8.01-271 violation."
After the hearing, Shebelskie sent a letter to the circuit court
citing authorities to establish the good faith basis of Ms. Brown's
position." Although the circuit court exonerated Ms. Brown of
contempt, it found that her counsel violated section 8.01-27.1 by
arguing in writing and orally that Ms. Brown did not have to
comply with the order." The court ordered Shebelskie and Wright
to pay Mr. Brown's costs and attorneys' fees."
Shebelskie and Wright then filed a motion for reconsideration
expressing their concern that the court misunderstood their ar-
guments.o "Shebelskie and Wright stressed that their argument
was not that [Ms. Brown] did not have to comply with the April
order, but rather that she could not be held in contempt because
the April order did not specify both an amount due and a pay-
ment date."" Shebelskie and Wright also argued that Wright
alone signed a pleading that fell within section 8.01-271.1 and
81. Id. (internal citation omitted).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 23-24, 752 S.E.2d at 880. Virginia Code section 8.01-271 provides that
"[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, pleadings shall be in accordance with Rules of the
Supreme Court." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
87. Shebelskie, 287 Va. at 24, 752 S.E.2d at 880.
88. Id.
89. Id., 752 S.E.2d at 880-81.
90. Id., 752 S.E.2d at 881.
91. Id. at 24-25. 752 S.E.2d at 881.
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that neither attorney made an oral motion.2 Ultimately, the court
entered a final order imposing sanctions against both Shebelskie
and Wright."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the circuit
court's decision to impose a section 8.01-271.1 sanction under the
abuse of discretion standard.94 The supreme court employed the
"objective standard of reasonableness" to determine whether an
attorney, "after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a reasona-
ble belief that the pleading was warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law."" Considering the sanctions against each attorney
in turn, the court first held that Shebelskie's oral argument did
not constitute an "oral motion" under section 8.01-271.1, and
therefore the circuit court abused its discretion by imposing a
sanction against him.96 The supreme court also found that the cir-
cuit court's findings misstated Wright's argument. 7 Because the
order did not express in definite terms the total amount to be
paid by Ms. Brown and failed to specify when Ms. Brown was to
pay the undetermined amount, the order was not final." The ar-
guments set forth in Wright's brief "were 'warranted by existing
law' governing contempt," and thus, the circuit court abused its
discretion by holding that Wright violated section 8.01-271.1.9'
E. Evidence
In Harman v. Honeywell International, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered multiple evidentiary issues.' In this
appeal, which arose from two consolidated wrongful death actions
against Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell"), the court
92. Id. at 25, 752 S.E.2d at 881; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
93. Shebelskie, 287 Va. at 25, 752 S.E.2d at 881.
94. Id. at 26, 752 S.E.2d at 881 (citing Gilmore v. Finn, 259 Va. 448, 466, 527 S.E.2d
426, 435 (2000)); see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
95. Shebelskie, 287 Va. at 27, 752 S.E.2d at 882 (quoting Gilmore, 259 Va. at 466, 527
S.E.2d at 435-36).
96. Id. at 27-28, 752 S.E.2d at 882-83; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp.
2014).
97. Shebelskie, 287 Va. at 29, 752 S.E.2d at 883.
98. Id. at 32, 752 S.E.2d at 885.
99. Id. at 32-33, 752 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting Gilmore, 259 Va. at 466, 527 S.E.2d at
435-36); see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
100. No. 130627, 2014 Va. LEXIS 97 at *1, 758 S.E.2d 515, 518 (June 5, 2014).
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addressed the following issues: (1) the admissibility of testimony
regarding the contents of an accident investigation report; (2) the
admissibility of lay witness opinion testimony; (3) statements
made by Honeywell's counsel during closing argument; and (4)
whether the circuit court erred in striking portions of a proffered
jury instruction defining proximate cause."o
Joseph A. Grana ("Grana") and his father, Joseph E. Grana,
Sr., were killed on April 27, 2008 when the airplane that Grana
was piloting crashed shortly after takeoff.'0 2 Although the takeoff
was normal, the plane spiraled nose-down to the ground approx-
imately ninety seconds into the flight.' The administrators of the
Granas' estates (the "Administrators") filed wrongful death ac-
tions in the circuit court against Honeywell, the manufacturer of
the plane's autopilot system.104
Breach of the warranty of merchantability was the only claim
raised at trial.0 ' The Administrators asserted that the design of
the autopilot system was defective in that it allowed debris to en-
ter into one of the gear systems, which then jammed the gears
and caused the plane to become uncontrollable."o Honeywell de-
nied any defective design or malfunction, instead maintaining
that the crash was simply the result of an inexperienced pilot un-
familiar with flying in difficult meteorological conditions."'7 Grana
had only recently begun pilot training and only received his pi-
lot's license approximately fourteen months before the accident
occurred."' He had, at most, only one hour of solo flight time in
cloudy conditions in this particular plane (the "Mooney plane")."10
Following a nine-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Honey-
well."
On appeal, the Administrators asserted five assignments of er-
ror, most of which focused on evidentiary rulings made by the cir-
101. Id. at *1-5, 758 S.E.2d at 518-19.
102. Id. at *2, 758 S.E.2d at 518.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *2-3, 758 S.E.2d at 518.
107. Id. at *3, 758 S.E.2d at 519.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *3-4, 758 S.E.2d at 519.
110. Id. at *4. 758 S.E.2d at 519.
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cuit court."' First, "the Administrators assign[ed] error to the cir-
cuit court's admission of testimony regarding an accident investi-
gation report prepared by Mooney Airplane Company describing
its investigation of the crash.""' This report (the "Mooney Re-
port") "describe[d] the plane's movements during flight and the
condition of the wreckage" and contained information on the posi-
tion of the jackscrew, "a component in the autopilot's auto-trim
system.""' Because "[t]he central question in the case was wheth-
er contaminated gears in the autopilot system caused the plane to
become . . . uncontrollable[,] . . . [a] critical issue at trial was the
position of the autopilot's trim setting at the time of impact.""4
Honeywell's expert "testified that the jackscrew was in a 'nor-
mal and safe take off position,' and therefore the runaway trim
could not have been the cause of the accident.""' Honeywell's
counsel pointed to the Mooney Report to support that opinion."6
When the Administrators objected on the basis of hearsay, Hon-
eywell responded that the report was "admissible pursuant to the
'learned treatise' exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Code §
8.01-401.1.""' The circuit court agreed and overruled the objec-
tions made by the Administrators."' The Mooney Report was then
introduced, in its entirety, into evidence."'
On appeal, the supreme court held that the testimony regard-
ing the contents of the Mooney Report failed to satisfy the re-
quirements of section 8.01-401.1.120 Specifically, the court found
that "the Mooney Report [was] not the type of authoritative liter-
ature contemplated by Code § 8.01-401.1, . . . [as it] lack[ed] as-
surances of trustworthiness, . . . [was] not a 'published treatise,
periodical, or pamphlet[]' on a 'subject of ... science,' . . . was pre-
pared for litigation purposes, and 'was not subject to peer review
or scrutiny."12' Further, the supreme court determined that the
111. Id. at *4--5, 758 S.E.2d at 519.
112. Id. at *5, 758 S.E.2d at 519.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *5-6, 758 S.E.2d at 519.
115. Id. at *6, 758 S.E.2d at 519.
116. Id.
117. Id., 758 S.E.2d at 519-20.
118. Id., 758 S.E.2d at 520.
119. Id. at *7, 758 S.E.2d at 520.
120. Id. at *9, 758 S.E.2d at 521.
121. Id. at *9-11, 758 S.E.2d at 521.
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Mooney Report was not a source generally used by experts in the
field and, therefore, was not a reliable source.122 For these rea-
sons, the supreme court held that "the circuit court abused its
discretion by permitting [Honeywell's expert] to testify regarding
the conclusions reached in the Mooney report."'23
The court went on to hold that the admission of these hearsay
statements was not harmless error. 2 4 The court stated that "[tihe
Mooney Report contain[ed] conclusions that [went] to the very
heart of the case."' 9 The Mooney Report was admitted into evi-
dence, repeatedly brought to the jury's attention, and was even
taken into the jury room during deliberations.'2 6 For these rea-
sons, it was very plausible that the jury verdict was impacted by
the erroneous admission of the hearsay statements, and so the
court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new
trial.'
Because it was likely the other issues raised on appeal would
arise in the retrial of the case, the supreme court went on to dis-
cuss the Administrators' other assignments of error.2 8 At trial,
the jury heard testimony from William Abel, Grana's friend and
flight instructor.'2 9 Abel testified that he and Grana had agreed
that Grana would not fly the Mooney plane in poor weather con-
ditions.'30 Abel also testified that he had concerns about Grana's
judgment in deciding to fly on the day of the accident. 3 ' According
to the Administrators, such testimony was "improper opinion tes-
timony by a lay witness that invaded the province of the jury. "32
Robert Norman, the co-owner of the Mooney plane, who re-
ceived his pilot's license at roughly the same time as Grana, testi-
fied about his personal experiences flying the Mooney plane.133
Additionally, Norman had experience flying a Cessna plane and
122. Id. at *11-12, 758 S.E.2d at 521.
123. Id. at *12, S.E.2d at 521.
124. Id. at *14, 758 S.E.2d at 522.
125. Id. at *13, 758 S.E.2d at 521.
126. Id. at *13-14, 758 S.E.2d at 522.
127. Id. at *14-15, 758 S.E.2d at 522.
128. Id. at *15, 758 S.E.2d at 522.
129. Id. at *15-16, 758 S.E.2d at 522.
130. Id. at *16, 758 S.E.2d at 522.
131. Id. at *16-17, 758 S.E.2d at 522.
132. Id. at *17, 758 S.E.2d at 523.
133. Id. at *17-18, 758 S.E.2d at 523.
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he compared the experience of flying the Mooney plane to that of
flying a Cessna plane.34 The Administrators argued that Nor-
man's testimony regarding his subjective feelings and experiences
flying these planes constituted "improper opinion testimony by a
lay witness, [was] irrelevant, and prejudicial.""
The supreme court analyzed the circuit court's decision to ad-
mit the testimony of Abel and Norman using an abuse of discre-
tion standard.'36 The court used Rule 2:70 in reviewing Abel and
Norman's testimony because neither was qualified by the court as
an expert."' "Rule 2:701 permits lay witness opinion testimony if
(1) it is reasonably based upon the personal experience or obser-
vations of the witness; and (2) it will aid the trier of fact in under-
standing the witness' perceptions."" Applying this rule, the court
determined that the circuit court should not have allowed Abel's
testimony regarding Grana's judgment as it was unnecessary.
Abel's opinion that Grana exercised poor judgment in deciding to
fly on the day of the crash "was superfluous-[t]he jury was fully
capable of listening to the specific facts recited by Abel and reach-
ing its own conclusion" regarding Grana's judgment.'40 In addi-
tion, the supreme court found that Abel's statements at trial were
"an impermissible assessment of Grana's culpability for the acci-
dent."
With regard to admitting Norman's testimony, the supreme
court found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.142
Unlike Abel's testimony, Norman's testimony, which focused sole-
ly on his own experiences flying the Mooney and Cessna planes,
did not assess Grana's judgment or his ability to pilot a plane.
Norman's testimony aided the jury in understanding his experi-
134. Id. Most of Grana's flying experience had been in a less-powerful, less-complex
plane manufactured by Cessna Aircraft Company. Id. at *4, 758 S.E.2d at 519.
135. Id. at *18, 758 S.E.2d at 523.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *18-19, 758 S.E.2d at 523 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:701 (2014)).
139. Id. at *21, 758 S.E.2d at 524.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *21-22, 758 S.E.2d at 524 (citing Davis v. Souder, 134 Va. 356, 362, 114 S.E.
605, 607 (1922)); CHARLES E. FRIEND & KENT SINCLAIR, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN
VIRGINIA § 13-5[a] (7th ed. 2012)).
142. Harmon, 2014 Va. LEXIS 97 at *22, 758 S.E.2d at 524.
143. Id.
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ences and therefore, pursuant to Rule 2:701, qualified as proper
lay opinion testimony.144 Further, Norman's testimony provided
the jury with an understanding of Grana's transition between the
Mooney plane and Cessna planes.145 Therefore, the circuit court
properly admitted Norman's testimony.146
Next, the supreme court turned to the Administrators' allega-
tion that Honeywell's counsel made statements during closing ar-
gument that violated both a pretrial order and Virginia law.'4 ' Be-
fore trial, the circuit court granted a motion in limine filed by the
Administrators seeking to exclude any argument regarding to the
safety history of the Honeywell autopilots.148 Despite this decision,
"during closing argument, Honeywell's counsel stated [that] ...
[an accident of this kind had] 'never happened before' [and that]
'[tlhere [was] no evidence this ha[d] ever happened anywhere any
time.""4 9 The Administrators immediately objected on the basis
that the statements violated the circuit court's order granting the
motion in limine.so The circuit court overruled the Administra-
tors' objection and allowed Honeywell to proceed."' Moments lat-
er, "Honeywell's counsel again argued that the autopilot system
had a 'safe design for [thirty-five] years, and no complaints,' and
that there was 'no evidence of a prior problem at all ever."1 52 On
appeal, the Administrators contended that Honeywell violated
the ruling on the motion in limine by repeatedly stating to the ju-
ry that there was an absence of other incidents."' The supreme
court agreed, finding "it was error for the circuit court to allow
Honeywell's counsel to make statements in contravention of its
own order."54
144. Id. at *23, 758 S.E.2d at 524.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *24, 758 S.E.2d at 525.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at *24--25, 758 S.E.2d at 525.
152. Id. at *25, 758 S.E.2d at 525.
153. Id. at *26, 758 S.E.2d at 525.
154. Id. at *26-27, 758 S.E.2d at 525. Honeywell argued that its counsel's statements
merely summarized the testimony of the Administrators' experts. Id. The supreme court
rejected this argument, finding that the statements made during closing argument went
beyond summarizing the experts' testimony. Id.
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Lastly, the supreme court discussed the Administrators' con-
tention that the circuit court erred in striking portions of their
proposed jury instruction on proximate cause. At trial, the Ad-
ministrators proffered an instruction defining proximate cause,
which stated, in part, "[tlhere may be more than one proximate
cause[]. Proximate cause need not be established with such cer-
tainty so as to exclude every other possible conclusion."'5 6 Honey-
well objected to this language, stating that it was not included in
the Virginia model jury instruction defining proximate cause.
The circuit court struck these two sentences.
5 1
The Administrators argued on appeal that their proposed jury
instruction was an accurate statement of Virginia law and that
the last two sentences, which were stricken by the circuit court,
were necessary to dismiss any incorrect belief that only one prox-
imate cause of the accident could exist."' The supreme court disa-
greed, stating that the "granted instruction fully and fairly cov-
ered the principle of proximate [cause]."16 Further, the supreme
court held that the additional sentences could have caused the ju-
ry confusion regarding the burden of proof."' Thus, the supreme
court ruled that "the circuit court did not err in striking the last
two sentences of the Administrators' proposed instruction on
proximate cause."'62
F. Remittitur
In Coalson v. Canchola, the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered the question of whether the Fairfax County Circuit Court
properly remitted the jury's award of punitive damages.'6 3 Victo-
ria Coalson and Michael Stemke each filed lawsuits against Vic-
tor Canchola seeking compensatory and punitive damages for
personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident.164 At the
155. Id. at *27, 758 S.E.2d at 525-26.
156. Id., 758 S.E.2d at 526 (internal quotations omitted).
157. Id. at *27-28, 758 S.E.2d at 526.
158. Id. at *28, 758 S.E.2d at 526.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *30, 758 S.E.2d at 526.
161. Id. at *31-32, 758 S.E.2d at 527.
162. Id. at *32, 758 S.E.2d at 527.
163. 287 Va. 242, 249, 754 S.E.2d 525, 528 (2014).
164. Id. at 245, 754 S.E.2d at 526.
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time of the accident, Canchola, who was driving while intoxicated
and talking on his cell phone, turned in front of a vehicle driven
by Coalson, who had the right of way and was unable to stop be-
fore colliding with Canchola's vehicle.16' As a result of the colli-
sion, both Coalson, who was driving, and Stemke, who was riding
in the passenger seat, suffered minor injuries.'" Canchola had an
extensive history of driving while intoxicated."' Despite receiving
a warning from a police officer not to drive, Canchola, who had
been drinking all day,' got behind the wheel and drove his vehi-
cle. After the accident, Canchola left the scene in his girlfriend's
vehicle.'" He was subsequently arrested at his hotel, where he
lied to the police about his involvement in the accident.o
The actions by Coalson and Stemke were consolidated and the
jury awarded Coalson $5600 in compensatory damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages against Canchola."' The jury also
awarded Stemke $14,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000
in punitive damages. 2 "Canchola filed a post-trial motion for re-
mittitur of both punitive damages awards, arguing that the
awards were excessive under Virginia law and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Noting the "significant
disparity" between the compensatory damages of the awards, the
circuit court concluded that Coalson's award was arbitrarily
made.7 4 Thus, the circuit court granted remittitur to Coalson's
punitive damages, lowering her award to $50,000.1'
On appeal, "Coalson argue[d] that the circuit court erred in
remitting her punitive damages award because the . . . decision
was based upon comparing her punitive damages award to
Stemke's, punitive damages award and upon the proportionality
of her punitive damages award in relation to her compensatory
165. Id. at 247, 754 S.E.2d at 527.
166. Id.
167. Canchola had at least seven convictions for driving while intoxicated on his record.
Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 248, 754 S.E.2d at 527.
170. Id., 754 S.E.2d at 528.
171. Id. at 245-46, 754 S.E.2d at 526.
172. Id. at 246, 754 S.E.2d at 526.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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damages award.""' According to Coalson, because of the serious
and dangerous nature of Canchola's conduct and its potential for
harm, a higher ratio between compensatory and punitive damag-
es was appropriate in this case.' Canchola responded that the
circuit court properly applied all of the remittitur factors."' The
supreme court recognized that there is no set standard or bright-
line test for determining the amount of punitive damages."'
For the first time, the supreme court addressed whether a
comparison of punitive damages awards is appropriate in evalu-
ating excessiveness.' Looking to case law discussing compensa-
tory damages, the supreme court determined that comparing pu-
nitive damages awards is not probative of whether or not they are
excessive.'"' Therefore, the supreme court held that "[t]he circuit
court's consideration of Coalson's and Stemke's relative ratios of
compensatory damages to punitive damages as a basis for grant-
ing remittitur was error."18
The supreme court went on to hold that Coalson's punitive
damages (as awarded by the jury) were reasonably related to both
her actual damages and to the necessary degree of punishment,
which in this case the court found to be great."' Because Cancho-
la's conduct was so deplorable and presented such a threat to
public safety, the court found that the punitive damages award
was not "unreasonable or strikingly out of proportion.""8 The su-
preme court did not find that the punitive damages award by the
jury "shock[ed] the court's conscience" and therefore found the
circuit court's remittitur erroneous.18*
Because the circuit court did not make clear whether it granted
Canchola's motion for remittitur on state law or federal constitu-
tional grounds, the supreme court went on to analyze Coalson's
176. Id. at 248, 754 S.E.2d at 528.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 248-49, 754 S.E.2d at 528.
180. Id. at 249, 754 S.E.2d at 529.
181. Id. at 250, 754 S.E.2d at 529 (citing John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 274 Va. 581, 595,
650 S.E.2d 851, 858 (2007)).
182. Id. at 250, 754 S.E.2d at 529.
183. Id. at 250-51, 754 S.E.2d at 529.
184. Id. at 251, 754 S.E.2d at 529 (quoting Baldwin v. McConnell, 273 Va. 650, 659, 643
S.E.2d 703, 707 (2007)).
185. Id., 754 S.E.2d at 529-30.
2014]1 45
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
punitive damages award considering the relevant federal consti-
tutional law.' Specifically, the supreme court discussed the three
guidelines prescribed by the United States Supreme Court for use
in reviewing whether punitive damages awards are excessive: "(1)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2)
the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by
the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the differ-
ence between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.""' The
Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that remittitur was also er-
roneous on federal due process grounds." Although the United
States Supreme Court has stated that the "ratios between actual
or potential harm and punitive damages should generally be
within single digits to satisfy due process requirements, . . . high-
er ratios may be constitutional where a defendant's actions are
especially reprehensible.""' This was one of those cases. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia determined that Canchola demonstrated
a need for "stronger medicine to cure his disrespect for the law,"
and, as such, the judgment of the circuit court was reversed and
the jury verdict was reinstated."'o
G. Demurrers
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the issue of using a
demurrer to challenge the enforceability of restrictive covenants
in an employment agreement in Assurance Data, Inc. v.
Malyevac.'' The employment agreement in question, between As-
surance Data, Inc. ("ADI") and John Malyevac, contained a non-
compete clause, a non-solicit clause, and provisions governing the
disclosure and return of confidential information.1 2 After
Malyevac resigned, ADI sued for violation of the restrictive cove-
nants in his employment agreement. Malyevac responded by fil-
ing a demurrer, contending that because the non-compete and
186. Id., 754 S.E.2d at 530.
187. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418
(2003)).
188. Id. at 252, 754 S.E.2d at 530.
189. Id. (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425).
190. Id. at 253-54, 754 S.E.2d at 531.
191. 286 Va. 137, 747 S.E.2d 804 (2013).
192. Id. at 139, 747 S.E.2d at 805.
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non-solicit clauses were overly broad, they were unenforceable. 9 3
ADI opposed the demurrer by arguing that the pleading "only
tests whether a cause of action has been pled and that it cannot
be used to decide the merits of a claim."' ADI contended that it
was entitled to put on evidence regarding the reasonableness of
the restraints on competition set forth in the agreement.'" The
Fairfax County Circuit Court sustained the demurrer, without
leave to amend, concluding that the restrictive covenants were
.unenforceable as a matter of law.'96
On appeal, the supreme court cited its previous decisions and
noted that the enforceability of covenants restraining competition
"must be evaluated on their own facts, by balancing the provi-
sions of the contract with the circumstances of the businesses and
employees involved.""' According to the court, a premise running
through its precedents "is that restraints on competition are nei-
ther enforceable nor unenforceable in a factual vacuum."' The
court then explained that a demurrer "has one purpose-to de-
termine whether a complaint states a cause of action upon which
the requested relief may be granted.""' According to the supreme
court, in ruling on demurrer that the covenants were overly broad
and unenforceable as a matter of law, the circuit court ruled on
the merits and curtailed ADI's ability to present evidence on the
reasonableness of the restraints.2 00 The supreme court conse-
quently therefore held that the circuit court erred by sustaining
the demurrer, because "[a] demurrer does not permit the trial
court to evaluate and decide the merits of the claim set forth in
a ... complaint."2 0'
193. Id. at 141, 143, 747 S.E.2d at 806-07.
194. Id., 747 S.E.2d at 807.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 144, 747 S.E.2d at 808 (quoting Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Inves-
tigations Servs., Inc., 270 Va. 246, 249, 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2005); Modern Env'ts, Inc. v.
Stinnett, 263 Va. 491, 493, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695 (2002)).
198. Id. at 144, 747 S.E.2d at 808.
199. Id. at 145, 747 S.E.2d at 808-09.
200. Id., 747 S.E.2d at 809.
201. Id. (quoting Concerned Taxpayers of Brunswick Cnty. v. Cnty. of Brunswick, 249
Va. 320, 327, 455 S.E.2d 712, 716 (1995)).
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H. Res Judicata
In Raley v. Haider, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
whether the Fairfax County Circuit Court erred in dismissing the
plaintiffs entire case on the basis of res judicata.20 2 Dr. Thomas J.
Raley was employed by a medical practice ("MISI") owned and
managed by Dr. Naimeer Haider.203 In the original case filed in
circuit court, Dr. Raley claimed that MISI did not pay him all of
the money he had earned. 204 Dr. Raley later amended his com-
plaint to sue both MISI and Dr. Hailer individually, alleging that
Dr. Hailer improperly dispensed funds from MISI to himself, in
turn depleting MISI of money in violation of Virginia Code section
13.1-1035, which governs distributions made by Virginia limited
liability companies.205 MISI and Dr. Hailer filed a demurrer argu-
ing that under section 13.1-1035 only the limited liability compa-
ny ("LLC") itself or a member of the LLC may bring an action.206
The circuit court agreed and sustained the demurrer on the basis
that Dr. Raley, who was not a member of MISI, could not bring
the case.207 The suit proceeded against MISI on other counts, and
Dr. Raley obtained a judgment against MIS. 208
When Dr. Raley was unable to collect the judgment, he filed a
garnishment proceeding naming Dr. Hailer as the garnishee and
asserting the rights of MISI for Dr. Hailer's alleged violation of
section 13.1-1035.209 Two days later, Dr. Raley filed a complaint
against Dr. Hailer and others seeking, as MISI's judgment credi-
tor, to enforce MISI's rights against Dr. Hailer with respect to the
wrongfully transferred money.2 10 Dr. Raley alleged in the second
complaint that Dr. Hailer had improperly transferred money
202. 286 Va. 164, 167, 747 S.E.2d 812, 814 (2013).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1035 (Repl. Vol. 2011) (outlining the restrictions
on distributions for Virginia limited liability companies).
206. Raley, 286 Va. at 167, 747 S.E.2d at 814.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 168, 747 S.E.2d at 814.
209. Id.
210. Id. Because both the garnishment action and Count I of the second Complaint
sought to assert rights of MISI for violation of Virginia Code section 13.1-1305, the actions
were consolidated. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1035 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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away from MISI in order to prevent the payment of Dr. Raley's
judgment.21 '
Dr. Hailer and the other defendants filed a demurrer, which
the circuit court sustained on all counts.212 The circuit court held
that, based upon the dismissal with prejudice in the original case,
"res judicata barred all subsequent claims regarding funds Dr.
Raley alleged to have been improperly transferred by Dr. Hailer
out of MISI."2 13
On appeal, the supreme court first addressed Dr. Raley's ar-
gument that res judicata could not bar the consolidated action be-
cause the circuit court's dismissal of Count II in the original case
was based on lack of standing, a jurisdictional determination, ra-
214
ther than on the merits. The court found that Dr. Raley had
waived this argument because he failed to articulate it to the cir-
cuit court.2 1' Thus, the court considered "the dismissal with preju-
dice of Count II in the original case [to be] a final judgment on the
merits."21
Alternatively, Dr. Raley argued that his assertion of claims be-
longing to MISI in the consolidated action could not be barred by
res judicata because the parties were not identified.217 Applying
Rule 1:6, which governs the doctrine of res judicata, the court de-
termined that for all intents and purposes, the consolidated ac-
tions were a proceeding by the judgment debtor (MISI) in the
name of the judgment creditors (Dr. Raley) against the garnishee
(Dr. Hailer).218 In effect, in the consolidated cases, MISI was suing
Dr. Hailer, whereas originally, Dr. Raley was suing Dr. Hailer.219
Because the same parties were not in opposition in the original
case and the consolidated actions, res judicata could not work to
bar the garnishment and Count I claims against Dr. Hailer.220
However, as to the remaining claims in the consolidated actions,
211. Raley, 286 Va. at 168, 747 S.E.2d at 814.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 169, 747 S.E.2d at 815.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 170, 747 S.E.2d at 815.
218. Id. at 170-71, 747 S.E.2d at 815-16.
219. Id. at 171, 747 S.E.2d at 816.
220. Id.
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Counts II through VIII, the court found that the same opposing
parties were involved as in the original case and that the claim
arose from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence.22 1 There-
fore, res judicata barred the re-litigation of the claims against Dr.
Hailer in Counts II through VIII. 222
With regard to the other defendants in the consolidated cases,
because they were not parties in the original case, the court held
that res judicata would only bar the claims against them if they
were in privity with Dr. Hailer or MISI in the original case.223 Af
ter analyzing the relationships and interests of the parties, the
Court concluded that there was no privity and, thus, res judicata
did not bar Dr. Raley's claims against the other defendants.224
I. Standing
In Small v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, the Supreme
Court of Virginia, in response to a certified question from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
addressed whether, under Virginia law, a clerk of court possesses
statutory standing to initiate a lawsuit, in his official capacity, to
enforce the real estate transfer tax on the recording of instru-
ments.225 The supreme court answered this question in the nega-
tive, and thus did not analyze the second certified question, which
queried whether the clerk could bring suit as a class representa-
tive on behalf of all clerks of court throughout the Common-
wealth.22 6
Acting in his official capacity as the Fredericksburg City Cir-
cuit Court Clerk, Jeffrey S. Small filed a putative class action in
federal court against the Federal National Mortgage Association
("Fannie Mae") and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
221. Id.
222. Id. at 171-72, 747 S.E.2d at 816.
223. Id. at 172, 747 S.E.2d at 816.
224. Id. at 173, 747 S.E.2d at 817.
225. 286 Va. 119, 123, 747 S.E.2d 817, 819 (2013). Article VI, section 1 of the Virginia
Constitution discusses judicial power and jurisdiction. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1. Specifical-
ly, it states that the Supreme Court of Virginia "shall, by virtue of this Constitution, have
original jurisdiction ... to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United
States[.]" Id. Rule 5:40 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia sets forth the certifi-
cation procedures. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:40 (2014).
226. Small, 286 Va. at 133, 747 S.E.2d at 824.
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tion ("Freddie Mac").m Professing to represent all clerks of court
in the Commonwealth, Small argued that Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac failed to pay the taxes imposed by Virginia Code sections
58.1-801 and 58.1-802, which levy real estate transfer taxes on
recorded instruments. 228 According to Small, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac improperly asserted that they were exempt from
paying taxes given their status as government entities.229 The de-
fendants raised a number of defenses, including the argument
that as clerk of court, Small lacked authority to bring an en-
forcement action under section 58.1-800.230
The central question before the supreme court was whether
Small had "statutory standing" to bring this action.23' Under fed-
eral law, whether a plaintiff has statutory standing is "simply [a
matter of] statutory interpretation."2 32 In other words, the analy-
sis hinges upon whether the plaintiff is a member of the class
given authority by a statute to bring suit.2 33 The court noted that
while the term "statutory standing" does not appear in its juris-
prudence, the concept is a familiar one to the court.2 34 According
to the supreme court, it is well settled that when a plaintiff such
as Small files an action under a particular statute, the determi-
nation of standing turns on whether the plaintiff possesses the
227. Id. at 124, 797 S.E.2d at 819.
228. Id. Section 58.1-801 provides, in pertinent part:
[o]n every deed admitted to record, except a deed exempt from taxation by
law, there is hereby levied a state recordation tax. The rate of the tax shall be
25 cents on every $100 or fraction thereof of the consideration of the deed or
the actual value of the property conveyed, whichever is greater.
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1.801(A) (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Supp. 2014). Section 58.1-802 imposes a
similar tax:
In addition to any other tax imposed under the provisions of this chapter, a
tax is hereby imposed on each deed, instrument, or writing by which lands,
tenements or other realty sold is granted, assigned, transferred, or otherwise
conveyed to, or vested in the purchaser, or any other person, by such pur-
chaser's direction.
Id. § 58.1-802 (Repl. Vol. 2013 & Supp. 2014).
229. Small, 286 Va. at 124, 747 S.E.2d at 819-20.
230. Id., 747 S.E.2d at 820.
231. Id. at 125, 747 S.E.2d at 820.
232. Id. (quoting Graden v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2007)).
233. Id. at 126, 747 S.E.2d at 820.
234. Id. at 125, 747 S.E.2d at 820.
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"legal right" to bring the action, which depends wholly on the
provisions of the relevant statute.2 35
Small asserted that he derived his authority to bring suit to en-
force the collection of unpaid real estate transfer taxes arose from
Virginia Code sections 58.1-801 and 58.1-802." The court disa-
greed, holding that the General Assembly gave the Department of
Taxation the exclusive authority to collect real estate transfer
taxes. 27 None of the tax statutes expressly authorize clerks of
court to file suit to collect unpaid real estate transfer taxes. 238 '
the statutes make clear, the filing of an enforcement action is dis-
cretionary-it is one of many options state officials have to collect
unpaid taxes.2 " The duties of the clerk of court, however, have
consistently been determined to be ministerial, which, by defini-
tion, makes them non-discretionary. 240 Thus, the court concluded
that the clerk's duty to collect real estate transfer taxes is a min-
isterial act that does not grant the clerk the authority to file an
enforcement proceeding.241
The issue of standing arose again in Bartee v. Vitocruz, when
the supreme court considered an issue of first impression: wheth-
er a sole surviving co-administrator of an estate may maintain a
wrongful death action.2 42 Following the death of Tonia Begley,
Robert Bartee and Wiley Begley ("Wiley") qualified in the Wise
County Circuit Court as co-administrators of Ms. Begley's es-
tate.243 Thereafter, Wiley died.244 Subsequently, Bartee, as the
surviving administrator of Ms. Begley's estate, filed a lawsuit for
wrongful death pursuant to section 8.01-50, alleging that Marissa
G. Vitocruz, an emergency room physician, was negligent in her
medical care and treatment, causing Ms. Begley's death.245
235. Id. at 126, 747 S.E.2d at 820.
236. Id. at 127, 747 S.E.2d at 821.
237. Id. at 129, 747 S.E.2d at 822.
238. Id. at 130-31, 747 S.E.2d at 823.
239. Id. at 131, 747 S.E.2d at 824.
240. Id. at 127, 747 S.E.2d at 821.
241. Id. at 132, 747 S.E.2d at 824.
242. No. 131283, 2014 Va. LEXIS 95, at *1, 758 S.E.2d 549, 549 (June 5, 2014).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at *2, 758 S.E.2d at 549-50.
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Vitocruz moved to dismiss the wrongful death action, asserting
that without the co-administrator (the deceased Ms. Begley) join-
ing in the case, Bartee lacked standing to file the wrongful death
claim.'4 The circuit court agreed, holding that Bartee lacked
standing to bring the lawsuit alone.2 47 The circuit court further
held that Wiley could be joined as an additional party plaintiff.4
Bartee filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court de-
nied; however, the court granted Bartee leave to file an amended
complaint.2 49 Bartee filed an amended complaint but did not add
Wiley as a plaintiff.250 Bartee explained that the circuit court clerk
refused his requested qualification or requalification, insisting
that the original qualification was effective and that Bartee, as
the surviving administrator, had the authority to act alone in
bringing the wrongful death action.2"
Vitocruz again filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of
standing, which the circuit court again granted.2 " On appeal,
Bartee argued that, under the doctrine of survivorship, as the
sole living co-administrator, he had the authority to bring the
wrongful death action.' Bartee argued that the doctrine of survi-
vorship applicable to executors also applies to administrators.25 4
This was a novel theory, however, the court found that the rele-
vant Virginia law, both statutory and case law, addressing the
powers of administrators and substitution of parties supported
Bartee's application of the doctrine of survivorship.25 5
The court began by noting the impossibility of the circuit
court's requirement that Ms. Begley be added as a plaintiff.256 Af-
246. Id., 758 S.E.2d at 550.
247. Id. The circuit court's holding was based upon the supreme court's holding in Ad-
dison v. Jurgelsky, which interpreted Virginia Code section 8.01-50(C) to mean that there
must be "a unity of action whether there is one personal representative or more than one."
281 Va. 205, 208, 704 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2011); see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50(C) (Cum. Supp.
2014).
248. Bartee, 2014 Va. LEXIS 95, at *2, 758 S.E.2d at 550.
249. Id. at *2-3, 758 S.E.2d at 550.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at *3-4, 758 S.E.2d at 550.
253. Id. at *4, 758 S.E.2d at 550.
254. Id. at *5-6, 758 S.E.2d at 551.
255. Id. at *6, 758 S.E.2d at 551.
256. Id.
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ter all, Ms. Begley was deceased.257 The court then explained that
under Virginia law, once an administrator is properly qualified
and appointed, another administrator may not be appointed un-
less there is a vacancy in the office.258 Because Bartee was an ex-
isting qualified administrator and there was no vacancy, he had
authority to exercise the powers attached to the office, thus,
standing to file the action. 259 Applying the doctrine of survivor-
ship, the power of appointment given to Bartee and Ms. Begley as
co-administrators to prosecute a wrongful death action could be
exercised by Bartee alone.260
J. Statute of Limitations
Responding to a certified question from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Dunlap v. Cottman
Transmission Systems, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
whether, under Virginia Code section 8.01-243, " . . . a two-year or
... five-year statute of limitations appl[ies] to claims of tortious
interference with contract and tortious interference with business
expectancy."26
James Dunlap filed suit against Cottman Transmission Sys-
tems, LLC and Todd P. Leff (collectively, "Cottman") "alleging
claims for tortious interference with contract, tortious interfer-
ence with business expectancy, and business conspiracy."262 The
claims stemmed from franchise agreements between Dunlap and
AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., under which Dunlap ran two
AAMCO repair shops for over thirty years.263 When Dunlap's facil-
ities closed, he blamed an alleged conspiracy between Cottman
and others who Dunlap alleged would benefit from the closing of
his franchises.264
257. Id.
258. Id. at *8, 758 S.E.2d at 551 (citing Bolling v. D'Amato, 259 Va. 299, 303-04, 526
S.E.2d 257, 259 (2000)).
259. Id. The court reached a similar conclusion with regard to executors in Davis v.
Christian, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 728, 738 (1859).
260. Bartee, 2014 Va. LEXIS 95, at *12, 758 S.E.2d at 552.
261. 287 Va. 207, 211, 754 S.E.2d 313, 315 (2014).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 212, 754 S.E.2d at 315.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia dismissed the business conspiracy claim for failure to al-
lege all elements required to establish such a claim. 26 5 The district
court later dismissed Dunlap's two remaining tort claims on the
basis that they were barred by the two-year statute of limitations
set forth in section 8.01-248.266 According to the district court,
Dunlap's claimed damages were "disappointed economic expecta-
tions," not injury to property.26 7 Thus, the claims were not subject
to the five-year statute of limitations.268
The supreme court disagreed, holding that the five-year statute
of limitations in section 8.01-243(B) applies. 26 9 Addressing the se-
cond of two certified questions, the supreme court explained that
"[tihe dispositive issue [was] whether tortious interference with
contract and tortious interference with business expectancy al-
lege injury to property."270 After addressing prior case law, the
court explained that "one of the elements of a claim for tortious
interference with either a contract or business expectancy re-
quires intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or
termination of the contractual relationship or business expectan-
cy."271 According to the court, "[s]uch interference is directed at
and injures a property right, i.e., the right to performance of a
contract and to reap profits and benefits . . . from the contract ...
[and] advantageous business relationships .,,272 Tortious interfer-
ence is not merely an allegation of disappointed economic expec-
tations.273 Therefore, the five-year statute of limitations applies.
K. Right to a Jury
In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Breeden, Inc., Norfolk
Southern appealed from the judgment of the Rockingham County
265. Id.
266. Id., 754 S.E.2d at 316.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 222, 754 S.E.2d at 321.
270. Id. at 219, 754 S.E.2d at 320.
271. Id. at 221, 754 S.E.2d at 321 (citing Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 120, 335
S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985)).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 222, 754 S.E.2d at 321.
274. Id.
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Circuit Court granting E.A. Breeden, Inc. ("Breeden") permanent
injunctive relief and requiring the railroad company to "restore a
private grade crossing over its railway tracks in Rockingham
County."275 On appeal, Norfolk Southern argued that "the circuit
court erred in granting the injunction without requiring Breeden
to prove harm and without balancing the equities."2 " As the Su-
preme Court of Virginia discussed, Breeden succeeded in interest
to a crossing agreement, which the circuit court found to be a val-
id covenant running with the land that obligated Norfolk South-
ern to construct and maintain a private graded crossing.277 There-
fore, Breeden was entitled to an injunction requiring the
replacement of the crossing unless Norfolk Southern could prove
that such a remedy would create a hardship or an injustice, that
performance would be impossible, or that enforcement would be
unusually difficult for the court.2 " At trial, Breeden put forth evi-
dence of its use of the crossing and its need to access the crossing.
Norfolk Southern did not call any witnesses, rather, it simply ar-
gued that Breeden did not suffer any injury.2 " The circuit court
ruled in favor of Breeden and granted the requested injunctive re-
lief.280
Norfolk Southern argued on appeal that the "circuit court erred
in hearing Breeden's request for a permanent injunction prior to
the trial scheduled for Breeden's breach of contract claim because
it deprived Norfolk Southern of its right to a jury."2 8' According to
Norfolk Southern, the circuit court's action violated Rule 3:22(e)
because the circuit court resolved factual disputes that were at
issue in the breach of contract claim.28 2 In analyzing Rule 3:22(e),
the supreme court held that, under the plain language of the rule,
"it only applies when there are jury issues to be tried.""' The
275. 287 Va. 456, 459, 756 S.E.2d 420, 422 (2014).
276. Id. at 463, 756 S.E.2d at 424.
277. Id. at 465, 756 S.E.2d at 425.
278. Id. (quoting Perel v. Brannan, 267 Va. 691, 700, 594 S.E.2d 899, 904-05 (2004)).
279. Id. at 466, 756 S.E.2d at 425.
280. Id., 756 S.E.2d at 426.
281. Id. at 467, 756 S.E.2d at 426.
282. Id.
283. Id. ("In any case when there are both jury and non-jury issues to be tried, the
court shall adopt trial procedures and a sequence of proceedings to assure that all issues
properly heard by the jury are decided by it, and applicable factual determinations by the
jury shall be used by the judge in resolving the non-jury issues in the case.") (quoting VA.
SUP. CT. R. 3:22(e) (2014)).
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court found that because no factual determinations common to
the breach of contract claim were to be decided by the circuit
court at the injunction hearing, Rule 3:22(e) did not apply.214
II. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF COURT
A. Virginia Rules of Evidence
On July 2, 2014, multiple amendments were made to various
provisions in the Virginia Rules of Evidence. The most significant
change is the addition of Rule 2:413, which discusses evidence of
similar crimes in child sexual offense cases.28 5 This rule, derived
from Virginia Code section 18.2-67.7:1, states:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of a felony
sexual offense involving a child victim, evidence of the defendant's
conviction of another sexual offense or offenses is admissible and
may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is rele-
vant.
(b) The Commonwealth shall provide to the defendant 14 days prior
to trial notice of its intention to introduce copies of final orders evi-
dencing the defendant's qualifying prior criminal convictions. Such
notice shall include (i) the date of each prior conviction, (ii) the name
and jurisdiction of the court where each prior conviction was ob-
tained, and (iii) each offense of which the defendant was convicted.
Prior to commencement of the trial, the Commonwealth shall pro-
vide to the defendant photocopies of certified copies of the final or-
ders that it intends to introduce.
(c) This Rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consid-
eration of evidence under any other rule of court or statute.
(d) For purposes of this Rule, "sexual offense" means any offense or
any attempt or conspiracy to engage in any offense described in Arti-
cle 7 (§ 18.2-61 et seq.) of Chapter 4 or § 18.2-370, 18.2-370.01, or
18.2-370.1 or any substantially similar offense under the laws of an-
other state or territory of the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, or the United States.
(e) Evidence offered in a criminal case pursuant to the provisions of
this Rule shall be subject to exclusion in accordance with the Virgin-
ia Rules of Evidence, including but not limited to Rule 2:403.286
284. Id. at 468, 756 S.E.2d at 427.
285. VA. R. EVID. 2:413 (2014).
286. Id.
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Rule 2:404, which governs character evidence, was revised to
include a reference to the new Rule 2:413.287 Subsection (b) now
states:
Except as provided in Rule 2:413 or by statute, evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally not admissible to prove the char-
acter trait of a person in order to show that the person acted in con-
formity therewith. However, if the legitimate probative value of such
proof outweighs its incidental prejudice, such evidence is admissible
if it tends to prove any relevant fact pertaining to the offense
charged, such as where it is relevant to show motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake,
accident, or if they are part of a common scheme or plan.2
Rule 2:803, which addresses hearsay exceptions that apply re-
gardless of the declarant's availability, underwent only a minor
housekeeping change. Specifically, the caption now properly
states that Rule 2:803(10)(a) derives from section 8.01-390(C).2 89
Likewise, the caption of Rule 2:902 was amended to identify sec-
tions 8.01-390.3 and 8.01-391(D) as the sections from which the
new subsection (6) was derived.2 90
Subsection (6), which governs certified records of a regularly
conducted activity, is new to Rule 2:902 and states:
(a) In any civil proceeding where a business record is material and
otherwise admissible, authentication of the record and the founda-
tion required by subdivision (6) of Rule 2:803 may be laid by (i) wit-
ness testimony, (ii) a certification of the authenticity of and founda-
tion for the record made by the custodian of such record or other
qualified witness either by affidavit or by declaration pursuant to
Code § 8.01-4.3, or (iii) a combination of witness testimony and a cer-
tification.
(b) The proponent of a business record shall (i) give written notice to
all other parties if a certification under this section will be relied up-
on in whole or in part in authenticating and laying the foundation
for admission of such record and (ii) provide a copy of the record and
the certification to all other parties, so that all parties have a fair
opportunity to challenge the record and certification. The notice and
copy of the record and certification shall be provided no later than 15
days in advance of the trial or hearing, unless an order of the court
specifies a different time. Objections shall be made within five days
thereafter, unless an order of the court specifies a different time. If
287. R. 2:404(b).
288. Id. (emphasis added).
289. R. 2:803.
290. R. 2:902.
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any party timely objects to reliance upon the certification, the au-
thentication and foundation required by subdivision (6) of Rule 2:803
shall be made by witness testimony unless the objection is with-
drawn.
(c) A certified business record that satisfies the requirements of this
section shall be self-authenticating and requires no extrinsic evi-
dence of authenticity.
(d) A copy of a business record may be offered in lieu of an original
upon satisfaction of the requirements of Code § 8.01-391(D) by wit-
ness testimo, a certification, or a combination of testimony and a
certification.
B. Petition for Appeal
Effective May 16, 2014, multiple rules were amended to incor-
porate changes made to Rule 5:17, which sets forth the require-
ments for filing a petition for appeal."' The changes to Rule 5:17
target the provisions concerning assignments of error. Subsection
(c)(1) now states:
Under a heading entitled "Assignments of Error," the petition shall
list, clearly and concisely and without extraneous argument, the spe-
cific errors in the rulings below upon which the party intends to rely.
An exact reference to the page(s) of the transcript, written statement
of facts, or record where the alleged error has been preserved in the
trial court or other tribunal from which the appeal is taken shall be
included with each assignment of error but is not part of the assign-
293
ment of error.
Subsection (c)(1)(i) was amended to remove the requirement that
assignments of error be set forth under a separate heading.29 4
Subsection (c)(1)(iii), which discusses insufficient assignments of
error, has been amended to read:
An assignment of error that does not address the findings or rulings
in the trial court or other tribunal from which an appeal is taken, or
which merely states that the judgment or award is contrary to the
law and the evidence, is not sufficient. An assignment of error in an
appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court which recites
that "the trial court erred" and specifies the errors in the trial court,
will be sufficient so long as the Court of Appeals ruled upon the spe-
cific merits of the alleged trial court error and the error assigned in
291. R. 2:902(6).
292. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17 (2014).
293. R. 5:17(c)(1) (emphasis added).
294. R. 5:17(c)(1)(i).
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this Court is identical to that assigned in the Court of Appeals. If the
assignments of error are insufficient, the petition for appeal shall be
295dismissed.
Finally, the amendment to Rule 5:17 added new subsection
(c)(1)(iv), which discusses the effect of a failure to use a separate
heading or include a preservation reference.296 Specifically, sub-
section (c)(1)(iv) states:
If the petition for appeal contains assignments of error, but the as-
signments of error are not set forth under a separate heading as pro-
vided in subparagraph (c)(1) of this Rule, a rule to show cause will
issue pursuant to Rule 5:1A. If there is a deficiency in the reference
to the page(s) of the transcript, written statement of facts, or record
where the alleged error has been preserved in the trial court or other
tribunal from which the appeal is taken, a rule to show cause will is-
sue pursuant to Rule 5: 1A.
These changes to Rule 5:17 resulted in amendments to other
rules as well. Rule 5:1A, which addresses penalties for non-
compliance, show cause, and dismissal, now includes a reference
to Rule 5:17(c)(1)(i) and (iii).29 8 According to Rule 5:1A(a), any de-
fects in the assignment of error requirements of Rule 5:17(c)(1)(i)
and (iii) are not curable. 299
Rule 5A:1A, titled "Penalties for Non-compliance; Show Cause;
Dismissal" was also added by amendment."'o Rule 5A: 1A states as
follows:
(a) Penalties; Show Cause; Dismissal. This Court may dismiss an
appeal or impose such other penalty as it deems appropriate for non-
compliance with these Rules. Except as provided in Rule 5A:12(c)
(1)(i) and (ii) regarding assignments of error, prior to the dismissal of
an appeal for any defect in the filings related to formatting, curable
failure to comply with other requirements, or the failure to meet
non-mandatory filing deadlines, this Court may issue a show cause
order to counsel or a party not represented by an attorney, prescrib-
ing a time in which to cure such defect or to otherwise show cause
why the appeal should not be dismissed or other penalty imposed.
(b) Report to Virginia State Bar. If an attorney's failure to comply
with these Rules results in the dismissal of an appeal, this Court
295. R. 5:17(c)(1)(iii) (emphasis added).
296. R. 5:17(c)(1)(iv).
297. Id.
298. R. 5:1A.
299. Id.
300. R. 5A:1A
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may report the attorney to the Virginia State Bar in accordance with
Rule 8.3 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.o
Similarly, Rule 5A:12 was amended to reflect the same changes to
the assignment of error requirements contained in Rule 5:17.302
That is, subsection (c)(1) now reads:
Under a heading entitled "Assignments of Error," the petition shall
list, clearly and concisely and without extraneous argument, the spe-
cific errors in the rulings below upon which the party intends to rely.
An exact reference to the page(s) of the transcript, written statement
of facts, or record where the alleged error has been preserved in the
trial court or other tribunal from which the appeal is taken shall be
included with each assignment of error but is not part of the assign-
303
ment of error.
Subsection (c)(iii) is a new addition, which like its counterpart in
Rule 5:17, discusses the effect of a failure to use a separate head-
ing or include a preservation reference:
If the petition for appeal contains assignments of error, but the as-
signments of error are not set forth under a separate heading as pro-
vided in subparagraph (c)(1) of this Rule, a rule to show cause will
issue pursuant to Rule 5A:1A. If there is a deficiency in the reference
to the page(s) of the transcript, written statement of facts, or record
where the alleged error has been preserved in the trial court or other
tribunal from which the appeal is taken, a rule to show cause will is-
sue pursuant to Rule 5A:1A.304
C. Petition for Rehearing
On November 1, 2013, a minor amendment to subsection (a) of
Rule 5:20 went into effect, which sets forth when and how a peti-
tion for rehearing may be filed after the refusal of a petition for
appeal or disposition of an original jurisdiction petition."o5 The
amendment clarified that counsel for the appellant may, within
fourteen days after the date of the order denying the appeal, file
in the office of the clerk of the supreme court a petition for re-
hearing.30 ' The amendment simply substituted the language "date
301. Id.
302. R. 5A:12(c)(1).
303. Id.
304. R. 5A:12(c)(1)(iii).
305. R. 5:20.
306. Id.
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of this order" for date of this notice."o' Further, as amended, Rule
5:20 now prohibits attempts to incorporate facts or arguments
from the petition for appeal.aos
D. Appeals from the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board or a
Three-Judge Circuit Court Determination
Rule 5:21, titled "Special Rules Applicable to Certain Appeals
of Right," discusses, in part, appeals from the Virginia State Bar
Disciplinary Board or a three-judge circuit court determination."'
Subsection (b)(5) of the Rule sets forth when and how an attorney
may file a motion for a stay pending appeal of an order suspend-
ing or revoking his or her law license."0 The January 31, 2014
amendment added language clarifying that an attorney may re-
quest a stay pending appeal of an order either suspending or re-
voking his or her license.' The amendment also added the follow-
ing language: "[a]ny order of Admonition or Public Reprimand
shall be automatically stayed prior to or during the pendency of
an appeal of the order."3 12
E. Notice of Appeal under Administrative Process Act
Rule 2A:2, which discusses notice of appeals pursuant to the
Administrative Process Act, underwent a minor revision. The
amendment to subsection (a) establishes that "[w]ith respect to
an appeal from a regulation, the date of adoption or readoption
shall be the date of publication in the Register of Regulations."
F. Pretrial Scheduling Order
Effective May 1, 2014, amended Rule 1:18 provides more detail
regarding the court's entry of the Uniform Pretrial Scheduling
Order.' Specifically, the requirement that the court provide no-
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. R. 5:21.
310. R. 5:21(b)(5).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. R. 2A:2(a).
314. R. 1:18
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tice to the parties before entry of the Uniform Pretrial Scheduling
Order has been removed."' Subsection (B) now states:
In any civil case in which a pretrial scheduling order has not other-
wise been entered pursuant to the court's normal scheduling proce-
dure, the court may, upon request of counsel of record for any party,
or in its own discretion, enter the pretrial scheduling order contained
in Section 3 of the Appendix of Forms at the end of Part I of these
Rules (Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Order). The court shall cause
copies of the order so entered to forthwith be transmitted to counsel
for all parties. If any party objects to or requests modification of that
order, the court shall (a) hold a hearing to rule upon the objection or
request or (b) with the consent of all parties and the approval of the
316
court, enter an amended pretrial scheduling order.
III. NEW LEGISLATION
A. Evidence
The General Assembly adopted Virginia Code section 8.01-
390.3 regarding the admissibility of business records under the
business records exception to the rule against hearsay.1 Section
8.01-390.3 provides:
[i]n any civil proceeding where a business record is material and
otherwise admissible, authentication of the record and the founda-
tion required by [Rule 2:803(6)] may be laid by (i) witness testimony,
(ii) a certification of the authenticity of and foundation for the record
made by the custodian of such record or other qualified witness ei-
ther by affidavit or by declaration pursuant to § 8.01-4.3, or (iii) a
318
combination of witness testimony and a certification.
Subsection (B) of the amended section 8.01-390.3 requires the
proponent of the business record to give written notice to all other
parties, reasonably in advance of the trial or hearing, if a certifi-
cation will be relied upon for the admission into evidence of such
a record."' A copy of the record and the certification must be pro-
vided to all parties so that all parties have an opportunity to
315. See id.
316. R. 1:18(B).
317. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 398, 2014 Va. Acts _, (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-390.3 (Cum. Supp. 2014) and codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-391 (Cum.
Supp. 2014)).
318. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-390.3 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
319. Id. § 8.01-390.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
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lodge an objection.32 0 Finally, section 8.01-390.3 states that if any
party timely objects to the use of the certification, the authentica-
tion and foundation required for the admission of the record must
be made by witness testimony.321
The General Assembly also amended section 8.01-390, which
discusses nonjudicial records as evidence.3 2  Section 8.01-390 now
includes a discussion of 911 emergency service calls.323 Subsection
(B) states:
Records and recordings of 911 emergency service calls shall be
deemed authentic transcriptions or recordings of the original state-
ments if they are accompanied by a certificate that meets the provi-
sions of subsection A and the certificate contains the date and time
of the incoming call and the incoming phone number, if available,
associated with the call.32 4
The legislature amended and reenacted section 16.1-88.2,
which relates to evidence of medical reports or records and the
testimony of health care providers and custodians of records.325
Section 16.1-88.2 provides that in an action for personal injuries
tried in general district court or appealed to the circuit court, ei-
ther party may present evidence as to the extent, nature, and
treatment of the injury, the examination of the injured person,
and the costs of such treatment and examination.32 6 Such evidence
may be presented through a report from the treating or examin-
ing health care provider "or a health care provider licensed out-
side of the Commonwealth for his treatment of the plaintiff outside
of the Commonwealth."m
The legislature further amended section 16.1-882.328 As amend-
ed, a medical report from a treating or examining health care
provider may be admitted into evidence in a civil action for per-
sonal injuries or to resolve a dispute with an insurance company
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Act of Mar. 27, 2014, ch. 353, 2014 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-390 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
323. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-390 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
324. Id. § 8.01-390(B) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
325. Act of Feb. 27, 2014, ch. 25, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-88.2 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
326. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-88.2 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
327. Id. (emphasis added).
328. Ch. 25, 2014 Va. Acts .
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or health care provider.329 However, such a report must be accom-
panied by a sworn statement from the custodian of the report
stating that the report is a true and accurate copy. 30 Prior to this
amendment, such a report could only be admitted if it was ac-
companied by a sworn statement of the treating or examining
health care provider.'
B. Expert Witness Testimony
During the 2014 session, the General Assembly amended and
reenacted Virginia Code section 8.01-401.2 relating to expert wit-
ness testimony of chiropractors and physician assistants.332 As
amended, section 8.01-401.2 allows a properly qualified chiro-
practor or physician assistant to testify as an expert "as to etiolo-
gy, diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, treatment plan, and disability,
including anatomical, physiological, and pathological considera-
tions within the scope of the practice of chiropractic . . .. The
new subsection (B) states:
A physician assistant, when properly qualified, may testify as an ex-
pert witness in a court of law as to etiology, diagnosis, prognosis,
treatment, treatment plan, and disability, including anatomical,
physiological, and pathological considerations within the scope of his
activities as authorized pursuant to § 54.1-2952. However, no physi-
cian assistant shall be permitted to testify as an expert witness for
or against (i) a defendant doctor of medicine or osteopathic medicine
in a medical malpractice action regarding the standard of care of a
doctor of medicine or osteopathic medicine or (ii) a defendant health
334
care provider in a medical malpractice action regarding causation.
C. Holding Cases Under Advisement
Virginia Code section 17.1-107 discusses the designation of a
judge to assist a regular judge who is holding a case under ad-
visement for an unreasonable length of time.33' As amended by
the 2014 General Assembly, section 17.1-107 now states that in
329. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-88.2 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
330. Id. § 16.1-88.2(1) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
331. Id.
332. S.B. 185, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2014).
333. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2014) (emphasis added).
334. Id. § 8.01-401.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
335. Id. § 17.1-107 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
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any civil action in which a circuit court judge failed to act on any
matter, motion, or issue submitted to the court for a decision or
failed to render a final decision for more than sixty days after the
decision was requested, the judge must report, in writing, to the
parties or their counsel the expected time of a decision."' A judge
who fails to make such a report or who fails to render a decision
within the time stated in the report may be reported to the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia.3 7 Importantly, the Gen-
eral Assembly's amendment shortens the advisement period from
ninety days to sixty days.3
D. Confidential Information
The General Assembly amended the Virginia Code by adding
section 8.01-420.8, which addresses the protection of confidential
information in court files.' Section 8.01-420.8 states:
[w]henever a party files ... [a] document containing a social security
number or other identification number appearing on a driver's li-
cense, credit card, debit card, bank account, or other electronic bill-
ing and payment systems, the party shall make reasonable efforts to
redact all but the last four digits of the identification number.34 0
This requirement applies "to all civil actions in circuit and district
court, unless there is a specific statute to the contrary."341 The
failure to redact such identifying information does not create a
private cause of action against the party or attorney who filed the
document or any court personnel who received the document.342
E. Statute of Limitations
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-
243, which relates to actions for injury to person or property.' As
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 427, 2014 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-420.8 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
340. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.8 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
341. Id. § 8.01-420.8(B) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
342. Id. § 8.01-420.8(C) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
343. Act of Apr. 4, 2014, ch. 586, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
243 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
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amended, section 8.01-243 now provides for a five-year statute of
limitations for actions for injury to property brought by the
Commonwealth against a tortfeasor for expenses arising out of
the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.3 44 With this change, the
statute of limitations applicable to actions by a parent or guardi-
an of an infant against a tortfeasor is now also applicable to ac-
tions for injury to property brought by the Commonwealth.3 45
F. Nonsuits
The legislature amended Virginia Code section 8.01-380, which
addresses the dismissal of an action by nonsuit.34 6 Specifically, the
bill adds subsection (E), which provides that "[a] voluntary non-
suit taken pursuant to this section is subject to the tolling provi-
sions of subdivision (E)(3) of section 8.01-229."'" In other words,
when a voluntary nonsuit is taken in a civil case, the statute of
limitations with respect to the cause of action is tolled and "the
plaintiff may recommence his action within six months from the
date of the order entered by the court, or within the original peri-
od of limitation . . . whichever [] is longer."34 8
G. Injunctions
Virginia Code section 8.01-626 was amended to clarify when
and how a justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia or a judge of
the Court of Appeals of Virginia may review a circuit court's
grant or refusal of an injunction.34 1 Section 8.01-626 requires that
the aggrieved party file a petition for review within fifteen days of
the court's order granting or refusing the injunctions.3  As amend-
ed, section 8.01-626 now includes the requirement that the ag-
grieved party serve a copy of the petition for review on opposing
344. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
345. Id. § 8.01-243(B), (E) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
346. Act of Mar. 3, 2014, ch. 86, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
380(E) (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
347. Id.
348. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2014).
349. Act of Apr. 3, 2014, ch. 526, 2014 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-626 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
350. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-626 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
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counsel."' The opposing party may file a response within seven
days of the date of service unless the court determines a shorter
time frame."'
H. Jury Trials
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-336
to clarify how the right to a trial by jury may be preserved.' Sec-
tion 8.01-336 now states that "[u]nless waived, any demand for a
trial by jury in a civil case made in compliance with the Rules of
Supreme Court of Virginia shall be sufficient, with no further no-
tice, hearing, or order, to proceed thereon."' Section 8.01-336 al-
so reduced the required amount of recovery sought for the court
to hear the entire case in the absence a waiver of a jury trial from
$100 to $20."
The 2014 General Assembly also amended section 8.01-337,
which deals with who is able to serve as a juror.' The legislature
added two military branches, the United States Marine Corps
and the United States Coast Guard, to the list of military person-
nel who shall not be considered residents of the Commonwealth
by reason of their being stationed in Virginia.' Prior to this
amendment, only members of the United States Army, Air Force,
and Navy who were stationed in Virginia were considered non-
residents of the Commonwealth during deployment.5
I. Attorneys'Fees
The General Assembly amended the Virginia Code by adding
section 8.01-221.2, which states:
[i]n any civil action to rescind a deed, contract, or other instrument,
the court may award to the plaintiff reasonable attorney fees and
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Act of Mar. 5, 2014, ch. 172, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-336 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Act of Apr. 4, 2014, ch. 595, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-337 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
357. Id.
358. See id.
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costs associated with bringing such action where the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the deed, contract, or other in-
strument was obtained by fraud or undue influence on the part of
the defendant.
The legislature also amended and reenacted Virginia Code sec-
tion 17.1-624 to eliminate the award of de minimis attorney fees
to any party that recovers costs.36 o
J. Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act
The General Assembly updated the Uniform Foreign Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act (the "Act").361 The Act provides
for recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments in a
United States state court.36 The Act is not applicable to a foreign-
country judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment
rendered in connection with a domestic relations matter. 63 The
Act specifies certain standards for recognition of a foreign-country
judgment."' For example, a foreign-country judgment will not be
recognized by a court of the Commonwealth if it "was rendered
under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals
or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of
law" or if the foreign court did not have jurisdiction.36 5 The Act al-
so states that "[a] party resisting recognition of a foreign-country
judgment has the burden of establishing that a ground for non-
recognition ... exists."366 The Act also lays outs the procedure for
seeking enforcement of a foreign-country judgment and explains
that the effect of recognition of a foreign-country judgment is that
it is "[e]nforceable in the same manner and to the same extent as
a judgment rendered in the Commonwealth."3 67
359. Act of Mar. 5, 2014, ch. 164, 2014 Va. Acts , (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-221.2 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
360. Act of Mar. 27, 2014, ch. 315, 2014 Va. Acts _, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 17.1-624 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
361. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 462, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
465.13:1 to .13:11 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
362. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-465.13:3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
363. Id. § 8.01-465.13:2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
364. See id. § 8.01-465.13:3 (Cum. Supp. 2014.)
365. Id. § 8.01-465.13:3(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
366. Id. § 8.01-465.13:3(D) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
367. Id. § 8.01-465.13:6(2) (Cum. Supp. 2014); see id. § 8.01-465.13:5 (Cum. Supp.
2014).
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K. Fines for Judgment Creditors
Virginia Code section 8.01-454, as amended, requires that
payment by a judgment debtor be entered on the docket by the
judgment creditor within ninety days of payment or satisfaction
of the judgment, or within ten days of being notified by the debtor
of the payment or satisfaction." Should the judgment creditor
fail to do so, the amendment provides that he shall be liable for a
fine of $100 and must pay the cost of releasing the judgment.3 69
Prior to this amendment, the judgment creditor was only subject
to a fine of up to $50 for failure to enter judgment within ten days
after receiving notice of satisfaction. 0
L. Summons for Unlawful Detainer
The 2014 General Assembly amended and reenacted Virginia
Code section 8.01-126, relating to summons for unlawful detain-
er.' Specifically, subsection (C) now permits the amendment of
the amount requested on the summons for unlawful detainer in
the event of the defendant's default.' When a defendant fails to
make an appearance in court, upon the request of the plaintiff
and a determination by the court regarding the accuracy of the
amount due, as set forth in the affidavit,
the court shall permit amendment of the amount requested on the
summons for unlawful detainer filed in court in accordance with the
affidavit and shall enter a judgment for such amount due as of the
date of the hearing in addition to entering an order of possession for
.373the premises.
M. Dismissal for Failure to Comply with Court Rules
Virginia Code section 8.01-4, which governs certain rules pre-
scribed by district courts and circuit courts, enables courts to cre-
368. Act of Mar. 24, 2014, ch. 274, 2014 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-454 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
369. Id.
370. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-454 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
371. Act of Mar. 5, 2014, ch. 168, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-126 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
372. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-126(C) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
373. Id.
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ate rules necessary to promote proper order and decorum and to
ensure the efficient and safe use of courthouse facilities and
clerks' offices.37 4 Section 8.01-4 also provides that courts may pre-
scribe certain docket control procedures.' However, as amended,
section 8.01-4 now limits the adverse consequences that a party
may suffer for failure to comply with such rules. 7 1 Section 8.01-4
states that "[n]o civil matter shall be dismissed with prejudice by
any district or circuit court for failure to comply with any rule
created under this section."7
N. Posting Courthouse Notices on Websites
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 1-211.1
to include that, if "any notice, summons, order or other official
document of any type is required to be posted on or at the front
door of a courthouse or on a public bulletin board at a courthouse,
it shall constitute compliance with this requirement" if the docu-
ment "is posted with other such documents . . . on the public gov-
ernment website of the locality served by the court where
such ... document is posted."7
0. Computation of Time
The legislature amended Virginia Code section 1-210, which
governs computation of time, to state that, "[flor the purposes of
this section, any day on which the Governor authorizes the clos-
ing of the state government shall be considered a legal holiday."7
P. Recording Proceedings
Prior to amendment by the General Assembly, Virginia Code
section 16.1-69.35:2 provided that tape recordings could be made
374. Id. § 8.01-4 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
375. Id.
376. Act of Mar. 27, 2014, ch. 348, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01.4 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
377. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-4 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
378. Act of Mar. 24, 2014, ch. 269, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 1-211.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
379. Act of Apr. 4, 2014, ch. 596, 2014 Va. Acts , - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 1-210 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
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of proceedings in general district court.so As amended, section
16.1-69.35:2 now allows the making of "an audio recording of pro-
ceedings in a general district court" by a party or his counsel, in-
dicating that such audio recordings are no longer limited to tape
recordings.38 '
380. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.32:2 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
381. Act of Mar. 24, 2014, ch. 268, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.35:2 (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
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